

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MASERU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MAPUTO 0816

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT (PARA 2 GARBLED)

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PERP, MZ
SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE ASSESSMENT- THREE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE:
MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTHERN AFRICA RELATIONSHIPS AND PROSPECTS.

1. SUMMARY. IN THE THREE YEARS SINCE INDEPENDENCE, MOZAMBIQUE HAS
CLOSED THE BORDER WITH RHODESIA AND ASSISTED ZIMBABWE LIBERATION
FORCES IN THEIR EFFORTS- AT CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
AND INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE. GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
PLAN FOR RHODESIA, OF LATE SHOWN INCREASING INTEREST IN THE CG
PROPOSAL ON NAMIBIA: CONTINUED ECONOMIC TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA
WHILE DECRYING THE SAG'S POLITICS; COOPERATED WITH SWAZILAND
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AND MALAWI TO FACILITATE
THEIR USE OF MOZAMBIQUE'S RAIL AND PORT FACILITIES: AND REITERATED
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A "ZONE OF PEACE".
WE DO NOT FORSEE ANY MAJOR CHANGES IN THESE POLICY DIRECTIONS
OVER THE NEXT YEAR. HOWEVER IF THE SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE DEVELOPS
IN WAYS UNACCEPTABLE TO MOZAMBIQUE (E.G. SEEMING UK OR US
SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, COLLAPSE OF THE ANGLO AMERICAN

NEGOTIATING EFFORT, OR RENEWED RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON MOZAMBIQUE
THE GPRM COULD SEEK GREATER SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN
MOZAMBIQUE
IN SUPPORT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. END SUMMARY.

2. THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE HAS A DEEP
COMMITMENT TO THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. AS A
RESULT OF FRELIMO'S TEN YEAR STRUGGLE WITH PORTUGAL, MANY OF
MOZAMBIQUE'S LEADERS BELIEVE THAT ONLY
THROUGH THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE CAN REVOLUTIONARY AIMS BE
ACHIEVED AND THE DROSS OF COLONIALISM.
PURGED. BUT THIS COMMITMENT IS TEMPERED BY PRAGMATISM.
THUS, WHILE SUPPORTING THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN RHODESIA
THE GPRM HAS CHOSEN NOT TO CONFRONT SOUTH AFRICA AT THE SAME TIME
AND EVEN IN THE CASE OF RHODESIA, THEY HAVE GIVEN WAY TO POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC REALITIES. MACHEL'S SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO
AMERICAN PROPOSALS ARE ROOTED IN HIS REALIZATION THAT THE SMITH
REGIME IS STILL TOO STRONG MILITARILY TO BE OVERCOME SOLELY
BY THE MILITARY EFFORTS OF ZANU AND ZAPU. AND THE REALITY THAT
MOZAMBIQUE'S STAGGERING ECONOMY CANNOT WAIT FOREVER FOR THE
STIMULUS WHICH WILL RESULT FROM NORMAL ZIMBABWE-MOZAMBIQUE RE-
LATIONS.

3. MACHEL AND THE GPRM ALSO ARE DEEPLY COMMITTED TO A POLICY
OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND LIKE-MINDED (READ SOCIALIST)
GOVERNMENTS. DESPITE THIS COMMITMENT IN PRACTICE THE GPRM HAS
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BEEN REMARKABLY PRAGMATIC IN HANDLING RELATIONS WITH ITS MORE
MODERATE NEIGHBORS. THE LONG WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE HAS TAUGHT
FRELIMO PATIENCE AND TOLERANCE, AND MOZAMBIQUE'S LEADERS APPARENT-
LY BELIEVE THAT TIME IS ON THE SIDE OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.
THE GPRM IS WILLING TO LET EVENTS TAKE THEIR COURSE WITHOUT AT-
TEMPTING TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THEIR NON-
SOCIALIST NEIGHBORS.

4. ZIMBABWE: THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA HAS BEEN THE PARAMOUNT
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE FOR THE GPRM AND PRESIDENT MACHEL. FOR THE
FIRST NINE MONTHS OF MOZAMBIQUE'S INDEPENDENCE THE BORDER WITH
RHODESIA REMAINED OPEN, BUT THE ANOMALY OF TRADING WITH THE DE-
CLARED ENEMY, THE INSURGENT ACTIVITY WITHIN RHODESIA, AND INCREASED
RHODESIAN ATTACKS IN MOZAMBIQUE CAUSED MACHEL TO CLOSE THE BORDER
AND SEVER ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THESE
SANCTIONS ON MOZAMBIQUE'S ALREADY CRIPPLED ECONOMY HAS BEEN SEVERE.
THE UN ESTIMATED THE COST OF SANCTIONS TO MOZAMBIQUE AT OVER DOL-
LARS 140 MILLION THE FIRST YEAR, AND OVER DOLLARS 110 MILLION
ANNUALLY THEREAFTER. FOREIGN AID TO OFFSET THESE LOSSES HAS NOT
APPROXIMATED THE NEED, BUT ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS, UNEMPLOYMENT,
AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES HAVE NOT CAUSED THE GPRM TO WAVER IN ITS
DETERMINATION TO KEEP PRESSURE ON RHODESIA.

5. RHODESIAN MILITARY INCURSIONS HAVE CONTINUED AND HAVE RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF HUNDREDS OF LIVES AND DESTRUCTION OF IMPORTANT COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE. THE PRESENCE OF 60,000 RHODESIAN REFUGEES ALSO TAXES THE GPRM'S LIMITED MEANS. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL/MILITARY DYNAMICS OF THE MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIA ISSUE HAVE CAUSED PRESIDENT MACHEL TO MAINTAIN A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO THE SITUATION: MILITARY SUPPORT TO ZANU AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR THE WAR WITH RHODESIA; ECONOMIC SANCTIONS; AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. MOZAMBIQUE HOPES THAT THIS COMBINED APPROACH WILL RESULT IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.

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6. PRESIDENT MACHEL HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE LEADERS IN THE GROUP OF FRONT LINE STATES. AGAIN DRAWING ON THE FRELIMO EXPERIENCE (FRELIMO WAS CREATED AS AN AMALGAMATION OF THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS) HE LONG URGED THE CREATION OF A UNITED FRONT TO DEAL WITH THE SMITH REGIME. WHILE THE MERGER OF ZAPU AND ZANU INTO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IS NOT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE FLAWS, COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS IS SEEN AS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. AFTER FIRST HOLDING BACK HIS SUPPORT FROM OUR ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, HE HAS RECENTLY BEEN A SUPPORTER OF OUR EFFORTS. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR HE HAS URGED NKOMO AND MUGABE TO ADOPT LESS INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR PROPOSALS AND TO TALK SERIOUSLY WITH US ABOUT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. MOZAMBIQUE'S LEADERS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN POWER IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE, BUT THEY HAVE SAID THEY WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER LEADERS ARE CHOSEN BY CITIZENS OF ZIMBABWE IN FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

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7. MACHEL AND MOZAMBIQUE HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE ON
EVENTS IN RHODESIA. THE LONG COMMON BORDER, TRANSPORT AND HARBOR
FACILITIES, AND THE BASES FOR ZANU- THE MILITARILY MORE ACTIVE
PARTNER OF THE FRONT, GIVE MACHEL CONSIDERABLE LEVERAGE IN INFLUENCING

THE EVOLUTION OF ZIMBABWE. THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE SUGGESTS
THAT HE HAS RESISTED THE TEMPTATION TO SEEK LARGE NUMBERS OF
CUBAN TROOPS OR OTHER "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES TO REPELL RHODESIAN
ATTACKS AND STRENGTHEN THE EFFORTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. WE
EXPECT THIS POLICY WILL PREVAIL OVER THE NEXT YEAR UNLESS A COMBINATION

OF THE FOLLOWING EVENT OCCUR A) COLLAPSE OF ANGLO AMERICAN NEGOTIATING

EFFORTS; B) PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION ON INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
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WITH SEEMING WESTERN CONNIVANCE; AND C) INTENSIFIED RHODESIAN
ATTACKS IN MOZAMBIQUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD THE INTERNAL
SETTLEMENT GAIN SUPPORT FROM THE ZIMBABWEAN GUERRILLA FIGHTERS AND
SHOULD SMITH BE REMOVED FROM THE SCENE, THE GPRM COULD CONCEIVABLY
COME TO TERMS BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, WITH A ZIMBABWEAN
GOVERNMENT WHICH LACKED THE FULL PARTICIPATION AND OR COOPERATION
OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT- PARTICULARLY IF BICKERING BETWEEN
ZANU AND ZAPU PERSISTS.

8. UNLIKE KAUNDA, MACHEL HAS NOT RAISED THE SPECTER OF PARTICIPATION
BY CUBAN TROOPS IN THE RHODESIA WAR AS A MEANS OF PRESSING
THE WEST TO HASTEN THE DEMISE OF THE SMITH REGIME. THE CUBAN
PRESENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE IS ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 50 AND 850
THE CUBANS ARE INVOLVED IN PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO A
VARIETY OF MINISTRIES, OFFICES, AND ENTERPRISES AS WELL AS
MILITARY TRAINING TO BOTH THE MOZAMBIQUE ARMED FORCES, AND ZANU'S
ARMY. CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE MAY CONTINUE TO RISE GRADUALLY AS

MOZAMBIQUE SEEKS TO STRENGTHEN ITS BORDER DEFENSES. WE CANNOT EXCLUDE A SITUATION IN WHICH CUBAN TROOPS BASED IN MOZAMBIQUE WOULD BE USED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST RHODESIA, BUT BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, AND MACHEL'S DETERMINATION AS A MILITARY MAN TO KEEP FULL CONTROL OF THE FORCES IN MOZAMBIQUE THIS DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM.

9. NAMIBIA AND ANGLOA, WHILE THE ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA DOES NOT ASSUME THE SAME IMPORTANCE AS RHODESIA, THE GPRM IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS THERE BOTH BECAUSE OF MOZAMBIQUE'S FRONT LINE PARTICIPATION, AND BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT ON ANGLOA ESPECIALLY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CASINGA RAID, WHILE THERE IS NO ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH ANGOLA THE COMMON HERITAGE OF LIVERATION STRUGGLES AGAINST PORTUGAL HAS RESULTED IN TIES BETWEEN FRELIMO AND THE MPLA. HOW EVER, THE RELATIONS ARE NOT AS CLOSE AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT.
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MACHEL WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN NETO'S INCLUSION AS A FRONT LINE PRESIDENT AND WE EXPECT THAT OVER TIME ANGOLA MOZAMBIQUE COOPERATION WILL IMPROVE. THE GPRM FOLLOWS DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLOA WITH A EYE TOWARD THEIR RELEVANCE FOR MOZAMBIQUE. MOZAMBIQUE HAS SUPPORTED SWAPO AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE GPRM'S VIEW OF NAMIBIAN ISSUES WILL BE COLORED BY THE OPIONS OF PRESIDENT NETO.

10. SOUTH AFRICA: THE EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC LINKS BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA HAVE REMAINED DESPITE THE DIVERGENT IDEOLOGIES OF THE TWO STATES AND THE DRUMFIRE OF ATTACKS ON APARTHEID BY MOZAMBIQUE'S MEDIA. SOUTH AFRICA MARKETS MOZAMBIQUE CITRUS UNDER A SOUTH AFRICAN LABEL, AND THE GPRM FREQUENTLY TURNS TO SA FOR EMERGENCY SUPPLIES OF COMMODITIES AND SPARE PARTS. MOZAMBIQUE SOMETIMES PREFERS TO BUY EQUIPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN ORIGIN THROUGH SWAZILAND (WITH THE SWAZIS ADDING THE COST IN EXCHANGE FOR "LAUNDERING" THE TRANSACTION). SOUTH AFRICANS ASSIST WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF MOZAMBIQUE RAILWAYS. AND THE SAG ENCOURAGES FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA TO SHIP VIA MAPUTO. WHILE THE VOLUME OF SA EXPORTS (MOSTELY MINERALS FRUITS, GRAIN, AND SUGAR HAS) DROPPED SINCE INDEPENENCE, IT HAS NOW STABILIZED AT AROUND 17,000 TONS A DAY. SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAYS ARE SPENDING DOLLARS 80 MILLION TO IMPROVE THE LINE TO MOZAMBIQUE'S BORDER AND THE LINE COULD HANDLE TRAFFIC FAR IN EXCESS OF CURRENT USE. MOZAMBIQUE EARNS ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE THROUGH DEALINGS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND THE GPRM REALIZES IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE ECONOMIC TIES.

11. THE TOPIC OF MOZAMBIQUE MINERS IN SOUTH AFRICA IS A MUCH DISCUSSED BILATERAL ISSUE. AT INDEPENDENCE OVER 100,000 MOZAMBIQUE CITIZENS WERE EMPLOYED AS MINE LABORERS IN SA. SINCE INDEPENDCE

THIS NUMBER HAS FALLEN TO 40,000 BUT SA CONTINUES TO RECRUIT
LABOR AT THIS ANNUAL RATE. UNDER THE OLD SA-PORTUGAL
LABOR AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS CONTINUED WITH MOZAMBIQUE UNTIL APRIL
1 OF THIS YEAR, SIXTY PERCENT OF THE MINERS SALARIES WAS PAID
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TO THE GPRM IN GOLD AT THE OLD RATE OF DOLLARS 42.22 PER OUNCE
THE GPRM THEN SOLD THIS GOLD AT THE CURRENT MARKET PRICE AND PAID
THE MINERS IN LOCAL CURRENCY. THIS WINDFALL PROFIT HAS BEEN
TERMINATED AND MOZAMBIQUE IS NOW PAID AT THE CURRENT MARKET PRICE.
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT MOZAMBIQUE COULD LOSE AS MUCH AS DOLLARS 100
MILLION ANNUALLY BECAUSE OF THE NEW VALUATION. MOZAMBIQUE
AND SA REPORTEDLY HAVE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL BY 1985
DOUBLE THE TONNAGE OF SAG GOODS SHIPPED THROUGH MAPUTO. THIS
AGREEMENT NOT ONLY SOFTEN THE BLOW OF THE CANCELLED MINERS
AGREEMENT, BUT ALSO GUARANTEES MOZAMBIQUE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FROM INCREASED RAIL AND HARBOR TRAFFIC AND CONTINUES MOZAMBIQUE'S
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA.

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12. IN EARLY 1977 MOZAMBIQUE HYDROELECTRIC PLANT AT CABORA BASSA BEGAN SUPPLYING POWER TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMMISSION (ESCOM) IT WILL BE YEARS BEFORE MOZAMBIQUE REALIZES ANY DIVIDENDS FROM ESCOM GOES LARGELY TOWARD THE RETIREMENT OF THE BILLION DOLLAR DEBT INCURRED DURING CONSTRUCTION. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE ONLY LOGICAL CONSUMER FOR THE POWER. BUT OVER TIME MOZAMBIQUE MAY BE ABLE TO ADVANCE AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CENTRAL REGION BY USING CABORA BASSA'S FACILITIES.

13. PARTLY BECAUSE OF MOZAMBIQUE'S DEPENDENCE ON ECONOMIC LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH WE DO NOT EXPECT THE GPRM WILL SEEK TO LESSEN UNTIL MOZAMBIQUE IS BETTER ABLE TO MANAGE ITS OWN ECONOMY, THE GPRM HAS BEEN VERY CIRCUMSPECT IN ITS RELATIONS
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WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANC AND PAC, THE ANC HAS A SMALL OFFICE IN MAPUTO AND THE GPRM DOES ASSIST IT IN MOVING ITS PERSONNEL OUT OF MOZAMBIQUE BUT THE ANC DOES NOT HAVE GUERRILLA TRAINING CAMPS IN MOZAMBIQUE AND IS NOT ALLOWED TO STAGE OPERATIONS. ONE REASON FOR THE GPRM'S ATTITUDE MAY BE THE BELIEF THAT THE ANC IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

14. TANZANIA: BECAUSE OF THE TIES FORGED BETWEEN TANZANIA AND FRELIMO DURING THE GUERRILLA WAR PERIOD, TANZANIA HAS CONTINUED TO BE MOZAMBIQUE'S MOST IMPORTANT AND INFLUENTIAL AFRICAN ALLY. MACHEL AND NYERERE CONSULT ON MANY SUBJECTS AND THE FRONT LINE STATES EFFORTS ON NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA HAVE REINFORCED THEIR COOPERATION. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ACCORDS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND MOZAMBIQUE'S COMMUNAL VILLAGE SCHEME IS SIMILAR TO THE TANZANIAN MODEL. TWELVE TANZANIAN AMBASSADORS RECENTLY TOURED MOZAMBIQUE IN PREPARATION FOR TASK AS MOZAMBIQUE'S DE FACTO DIPLOMATS FOR CONSULAR AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE WILL USE TANZANIAN FACILITIES FOR TRAINING ITS OWN FOREIGN AFFAIRS PERSONNEL. THE IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY ON FOREIGN POLICY ALLOWS THE GPRM TO SAVE ITS LIMITED POOL OF TRAINED MANPOWER FOR TASKS OTHER THAN DIPLOMACY. THERE IS A STEADY STREAM OF TANZANIAN ADVISORS IN MAPUTO, AND TROOPS, ARMS, AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDED TO THE GPRM, WE EXPECT CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO REMAIN VERY CLOSE.

15. ZAMBIA: WHILE MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA FOLLOW DIFFERENT DEVELOPMENT MODELS, THEY HAVE INCREASED BILATERAL COOPERATION DURING THE PAST YEAR AND INTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THEIR MUTUAL PROBLEM RHODESIA. MOZAMBIQUE HAS PROMISED TO COMPLETE THE ALL WEATHER ROAD FROM BENE TO CASSACATIZA IN TETE PROVINCE

BY MID 1979. THIS ROAD WILL PROVIDE ZAMBIA WITH ACCESS TO RAIL
AND ROAD CONNECTIONS TO THE PORT AT BEIRA. THE FRONT INE STATES
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GROUPING HAS BEEN A FACTOR IN SPURRING TIES BETWEEN ZAMBIA AND
MOZAMBQIUE AND WE EXPECT THIS TREND TO CONTUINE.

16. MALAWI AND SWAZILAND THE OTHER MAJORITY RULED STATES OF THE
REGION ENJOY GENERALLY CORRECT IF NOT CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH
MOZAMBIQUE ALTHOUGH MALAWI DOES NOT HAVE FORMAL DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH THE GPRM AND THE MODERATE TO CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS
OF MALAWI, SWAZILAND LESOTHO, AND BOTSWANA. ARE VIEWED WITH
DISFAVOR BY SOME OF THE RADICAL IN THE GPRM. HOWEVER RELATIONS WITH
WITH ALL FOUR STATES SEEM TO HAVE IMPROVED SINCE MOZAMBIQUE
INDEPENDENCE.

17. IN THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MALAWI, GOM
OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY COME TO MAPUTO TO DISCUSS ISSUES. STRAINS
ARE STILL PRESENT AS DEMONSTRATED BY MOZAMBQIUE'S SEIZURE OF A
MALAWIAN TANKER ON LAKE MALAWI WHICH HAD STRAYED INTO MOZAMBIQUE
WATERS, BUT MALAWI CONTUINES TO MAKE EXTENSIVE USE OF THE
MOZAMBIQUE RAILWAYS AND EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE PORT TRAFFIC
AT BEIRAA AND NACALA IS GENERATED BY MALAWI. SOME ANTI FRELIMO
GROUPS OPERATE FROM MALAWI, BUT THEIR IMPACT IS MINIMAL.

18. SWAZILAND IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON MOZAMBIQUE FOR ACCESS
TO OCEAN SHIPPING. EIGHTY PERCENT OF SWAZILAND'S NON SOUTH
AFRICAN EXPORTS (COAL IRON, ORE, SUGAR, ETC). MOVE BY RAIL THROUGH
MAPUTO'S HARBOR AND MOST OF SWAZILANDS NON SOUTH AFRICAN IM
PORTS PASS THROUGH MAPUTO. IN ADDITION, MOST POL FOR SWAZILAND
IS SHIPPED THROUGH MAPUTO. IN OCTOBER 1977 THE TWO GOVERNMENTS
SIGNED A COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WHICH WAS ONE INDICATION OF
MOZAMBIQUE'S PRAGMATIC, ATTITUDE TOWARD CONSERVATIVE NEIGHBOTS
BUT SWAZILAND REMAINS LEARY OF MOZAMBIQUE INTENTIONS AND IS PUSHING
AHEAD WITH COSTLY PLANS TO REDUCE ITS DEPENDENCE ON MOZAMBQIUE
BY BUILDING RAIL LINKS THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA.

19. INDIAN OCEAN: BECAUSE OF MOZAMBIQUE'S LONG COASTLINE AND ITS
FINE HARBORS, THE GPRM PAYS CLOSE ATTNTION TO DEVELOPMENTS
CONCERNING THE INDIAN OCEAN. THERE ARE NOR FOREIGN MILITARY
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BASES IN MOZAMBQIUE, BUT SOUTH AFRICAN AND RHODESIAN MEDIA PERIODI-
CALLY REPORT ON ALLEGED SOVIET BUILDUPS IN SUCH PLACES AS NACALA
AND BAZARUTO ISLAND. WHILE WE PERIODICALLY BRIEF MACEHL ON
USG POSITION ON THE INDIAN OCEAN. WE EXPECT THE GPRM WILL

CONTUINE TO SPEAK OUT IN FAVOR OF THE CREATION OF A "ZONE OF PEACE"
FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF WESTERN NAVAL FORCES
ANDBASES, WHILE SAYING LITTLE ABOUT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA
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